multiple levels of the corporate governance matrix.
2 Concern radiates from the micro level of individual transactions to the mezzanine impact on particular industrial and financial sectors. The identified threats encompass potential (or actual) conflicts of interest among managers involved in market exit proposals. At market governance level they involve potential (or actual) abuse of fiduciary duty by those providing corporate advisory services. 3 The industry thrives at times of high liquidity, cheap debt and low levels of corporate default, conditions that pertain on global markets presently. 4 The increasingly erratic behaviour of debt markets has prompted, however, fears of wider supranational systemic risk. 5 level, warnings of the increased risk of insider trading and market manipulation are designed, primarily, to trigger an industry-led calibration of internal compliance programs. 8 This signalling has been accompanied by the exercise of unsubtle pressure on those providing core capital and leveraged debt. The superannuation industry has been cautioned against over-investing in illiquid heavily leveraged assets. 9 Within the banking sector the loosening of contractual covenants (making borrowing conditions much more favourable) has been identified as a major contributing factor to systemic threats at each level of control. 10 Leading private equity practitioners in New York, London and Sydney agree that the global dependency on leverage is highly risky. 'The market that is most overblown and most dangerous and the scariest is the leveraged finance market', remarks John Barber, Managing Partner of Citigroup Private Equity in New York. 'It is those markets silliness that is allowing most of the private equity boom.' The weakening of contractual covenants is, as he puts it, 'the cherry on top of the whipped cream on top of the ice cream' for private equity.
11 Across the Atlantic in Already there are signs that the policy approach is hardening slightly, with a particular focus on the propensity of lenders to provide 'bridge financing' in order to gain access to lucrative underwriting and debt securitisation assignments, see Greg Ip, 'Fed, Other Regulators Turn Attention to Risk in Lenders LBO Lending', Wall Street Journal (New York), 18 May 2007, C1; for acceptance of structural imperatives in the marketplace, see FSA, 'Discussion Paper 06/06', above n 8, 60 (suggesting the covenant loosening is linked to the perception that the corporations targeted are much more profitable and thus less likely to default: at 59. The study also found that relationship banking has declined, competitive auctions have increased, a synthesis that reduces meaningful restraints: at 60). 11 Interview with John Barber (New York, 24 April 2007).
London, the Group Communications Director of 3i, one of Europe's largest private equity groups, accepts 'covenants are of variable quality'. 12 Both suggest, however, that it is essential to disaggregate irrational lending from rational borrowing. Moreover, in high growth markets such as Australia, the industry argues less than three per cent of all loans are made to private equity backed-business. 13 This raises a critical question. If the direct risk posed is statistically insignificant, why has private equity generated such opposition that it has become 'the whipping boy' of wider market forces? 14 The size and quality of corporations now targeted increases political salience. Low price to earning ratios, for example, makes large scale capitalised US companies arguably one of the cheapest asset classes available. Even accounting for the frothiness of today's market, with an average ratio of 16.9, the S&P index remains 1.9 per cent below a 20 year average (and substantially below the peak of 27.8 encountered at the peak of the dot-com bubble in 2000). Similarly, low levels of corporate debt make Australian corporations particularly attractive, as indeed does large swathes of the Asia-Pacific. 15 At divisional level, global divestiture of non-core assets to generate earnings has disproportionately benefited the private equity industry. Arguably, its leading practitioners have perfected the art of the sale rather than discovered a magic formula to generate longer-term growth. 16 In part, the problem for the industry is endogenous. Flawed presentation, coupled with the extraordinary personal returns and transaction fees associated with these deals, inevitably invokes 'the politics of envy'. 17 Proponent confidence in a perceived superior operating model, linked to a doctrinaire defence of laissez-faire economics, has bordered, at times, on arrogance. 18 Articulating such a narrow vision of utility makes the political establishment nervous. National elections are pending in three of the most important private equity markets -the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. In such circumstances, conspicuous consumption is not necessarily an advisable public relations strategy. 19 It is not surprising therefore that political defences tend to emanate from those insulated from electoral competition, such as the libertarian European Union Commissioner for Internal Markets, Charlie McCreevy. 20 Paradoxically, the primary virtue associated with private equity, namely its capacity to evade the public disclosure regime, has become a major problem. It has made the industry particularly vulnerable to critiques based on transparency and accountability. While opacity is common to many alternative investment vehicles, including esoteric derivative trading, private equity has a very public face. Moreover, the extent to which iconic (and profitable) corporations are being restructured has an immediate market as well as socio-political impact. This has prompted unexpected and forthright criticism from within the financial establishment. Michael Gordon, one of the most influential fund managers in the City of London, caused consternation recently with a scathing rejection of the private equity model:
Institutions and their advisers are choosing to move into a form of investment that provides little real diversification from equities over time; comes with higher risks because of leverage; has far less transparency than a portfolio of listed stocks -and for which the institution has to pay premium fees. Am I the only one struggling to make sense of this.
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The intervention undoubtedly serves the entrenched interests of the fund management industry, which has seen pension funds in the United Kingdom expend proportionately more capital into private equity vehicles. When asked directly did he believe private equity investment was being missold, Michael Gordon not only replied in the affirmative but felt that the pension funds largely lacked the sophistication to even know it. 22 Much more significantly, the unease within the City of London has unsettled stable alliances. Leading financiers have attempted to blunt political sensitivity by expressing concern about worker and wider stakeholder rights. 23 In the process, the sedimentary foundations of market capitalism have been disturbed.
From London to Canberra (and, to a limited extent, Washington) it has proved impossible to limit discussion of private equity to technocratic analysis. 24 This is not necessarily without normative value. Disputation generates the opportunity to partially reconstruct the social contract governing the corporation and the market in which it is nested.
25
This occurs for three interconnected reasons, sketched here but explored in more detail below. First, the LBO exposes the control limitations of the extant corporate governance paradigm. Notwithstanding the mediating effect of attempts to inculcate responsible corporate citizenship, governance is largely presented as a mechanism to ensure shareholder protection. Positing wealth maximisation for shareholders as the primary purpose of the corporation reduces the capacity of governance to deal with the ideational challenge presented by private equity. 26 Given that most LBOs offer substantial premiums over underlying market prices shareholders are rarely compromised, unless the sale process is itself fundamentally flawed. This suggests the need to rearticulate both the objectives of corporate governance and strategies required to protect stakeholders from the vagaries of a financial revolution.
Second, these internal deficiencies are magnified at market level because of transactional dynamics (particularly in sectors or jurisdictions in which one institutional actor has overwhelming presence). This dominance can impoverish the capacity of those providing corporate advisory services to either caution or exercise restraint. More generally, the dynamics of private equity make the efficacy of the gatekeeper function accorded to intermediaries by law or professional norms potentially unsustainable in the longer term. Amelioration of potential excess requires market participants to reach fundamental agreement on the social function of regulation irrespective of whether a rules or principles based approach is adopted.
Financial Markets and the Structure of UK PLC, Parliament of the United Kingdom, London, 20 March 2007. The UK inquiry covers 'the effects of the current corporate status of private equity funds, including both their domicile and ownership structure', taxation implications and the wider socio-economic context, terms of reference that were subsequently adopted by its Australian counterpart. 25 Here it is important to emphasise that shareholders do not fit into this class. To be sure, it is necessary to ensure that the procedures governing MBOs are conducted in an open, fair and transparent manner, but with most offering substantial premiums on historic trading patterns, the shareholder is rarely disadvantaged. Third, private equity's continued expansion is predicated on securing an increasing share of pension fund asset allocation. In the Australian context, it is unfortunate that submissions to a Senate Inquiry have adopted an unnecessarily defensive tone. 27 At issue is not the legitimacy of private equity; rather how the financial and social impact can be managed. A focused dialogue can generate protocols designed to further ultimate societal as well as proximate wealth maximisation goals.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, the structural determinants of the private equity market are mapped. Second, I demonstrate how the battle for control of Qantas crystallises the latent and extant risks within and between critical nodes in the corporate governance matrix. Third, it evaluates differential regulatory and jurisprudential responses. In the final section the paper argues if the LBO offered a true and lasting solution to intrinsic and intractable corporate governance problems, its remarkable renaissance should be uniformly welcomed. In reality, however, the locus of the principal-agent conflict it ostensibly solves is displaced to a largely unregulated arena, which, in turn, exacerbates potential systemic oversight deficiencies.
I
A CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD
The seemingly unstoppable global rise in private equity continued in 2006. The frenetic pace of change is encapsulated in the fact that nine of the ten largest LBOs took place in the past 18 months. 28 The record set in the RJR Nabisco takeover stood for 17 years. In 2006, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts broke the record by acquiring HCA, a US-based healthcare corporation, for US$33 billion. Its private equity rival, Blackstone Partners, eclipsed this with the purchase of Equities Office Property 27 Submissions to an Australian parliamentary inquiry by the superannuation industry suggested the political fears were unfounded. UniSuper, for example, noted the importance of private equity to asset portfolio balance within appropriate stress levels (2.5-7.5 per cent of total investments), see Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 26 April 2007 (UniSuper) stating it will not 'shun buyout managers, public to private deals, or private equity more generally' but seek 'to manage these risks through sound portfolio construction and manager selection': at 6; see also Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Economics, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, May 2007 (Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees), drawing a distinction between positive investment in venture capital and more problematic corporate-raiders, which can be dealt with through corporate governance procedures: at 9. 28 'Will Street Pity the Fools', Wall Street Journal (New York), 5 January 2007, C14.
Trust for US$38.9 billion (including debt). 29 Now even that looks likely to be surpassed with the planned acquisition of TXU, a Texas utility and the sale by Daimler of Chrysler to Cerberus Capital Management, which will involve raising US$65 billion in debt. 30 Key to the deal is a restructuring of pension liabilities. If Cerberus is successful it could put the other Detroit automakers into play and place private equity squarely in the mainstream of corporate finance. 31 The renaissance appears to confirm a controversial hypothesis first advanced in 1989 that we are witnessing 'the eclipse of the public corporation' 32 Before evaluating the factors that have facilitated the global renaissance of private equity, it is necessary to discuss the industry's modus operandi.
A

Inside the Alchemist Workshop
Despite the exponential increase in the number of private equity investment vehicles, the operating structure has remained remarkably homogeneous. 33 The archetypal private equity fund tends to coalesce around a limited liability partnership model. 34 The manner in which private equity players in the United States are listing does little to change this dynamic. 35 Each fund has a finite operating lifespan, normally 10 years, which is under the control of a General Partner. The General Partner decides strategic focus and portfolio balance. It conducts due diligence on planned acquisitions, recruits or disposes operational management, and decides divestiture policy. The model precludes the investors, known as limited partners, from exercising any direct decisionmaking role (as indeed are institutional investors under the public corporation). Operational discretion is limited only by the size of the capital initially raised, any contractual covenants negotiated by the investors, or subsequently imposed by institutional lenders. 36 Examples of the former include limits on geographic or industry exposure, as well as detailed guidelines on what constitutes due diligence and whether external validation of valuations are required pre-purchase. 37 Postpurchase, a critical governance concern is to prevent controlling interest expropriation through excessive fee charging. Disputes are resolved by recourse to private law. Little or no room for external oversight over freedom to contract is envisaged. In the public sphere, the securities regulator, for example, can demand changes to a company prospectus. By contrast the private equity contract is negotiated almost entirely 34 Some major holding funds do trade publicly in their own right, for example, the fully listed 3i in the United Kingdom and Onex Partners in Canada. There are however significant differences in operating styles. 3i, for example, invests across the whole range of private equity, from venture capital, through 'patient' minority shareholding to LBOs. Unlike many of its competitors, 3i does not engage in club deals nor does it target largecapitalised corporations, factors that have minimised its risk profile: interview with Patrick Dunne, above n 12. 35 behind closed doors, with non-disclosure clauses limiting discussion of either terms or investments.
The Limited Partner commits a specified percentage of capital, which is drawn (on demand) as required. The partnership is structured to minimise liability in the event of an individual corporate failure within the portfolio (for example by capping the percentage of overall capital deployed in single investments and curtailing cross-subsidisation). Management fees are normally pegged at between one and three per cent of the total committed (although they may be front-loaded). The maximum return on investment is normally capped at 80 per cent, net of specific transaction fees, including the purchase of technical legal and accounting advice. 38 Known as 'carried interest', this premium may, however, be subject to the fund exceeding a pre-determined success rate (for example, a certain percentage return).
Initial investment is normally committed within the first five years of the fund. This enhances the maximisation of returns before the fund elapses and capital returned (unless contractually varied). The General Partner has a vested interest to close the fund well in advance of formal closure. Redemption signals higher investment returns, eases subsequent marketing and obviate potential conflicts of interest between competing internal investment funds.
In practice, access to this most illiquid of asset classes is restricted to institutional and accredited investors and a limited number of high net worth individuals. 39 Relative opacity has, however, made the industry vulnerable to criticism. Exemption from public law disclosure obligations in the United States, for example, has been presented as evasion. 40 Recent research suggests increased disclosure could enhance deal flow by making the asset class more attractive to a greater range of risk-averse institutional investors. 41 funds wish to maintain discretion over either portfolio performance or the mix of investors in each fund to protect proprietary intellectual capital. Disclosure could also erode the alchemist mystique associated with already (apparently) successful funds, which is used to justify managerial fees. What is also clear, however, is the marked diversity in fund performance. Inordinate focus on increased deal scalability risks misconceiving the private equity market. Size is not necessarily an accurate indicator of performance. 42 Only the top quartile of private equity funds in the United States has outperformed the market, although European funds have fared rather better. 43 Given the statistical evidence of patchy performance, it is necessary to more finely granulate why private equity has captured the ideational zeitgeist.
B
Back to the Future: The Return of the LBO
Earlier periods of sustained merger and acquisition activity tended to be concentrated, corresponding to sector-specific shocks, such as deregulation, privatisation or maturation. 44 Evidence from the LBO boom in United States and the United Kingdom, and, more recently, Australia cannot be so readily explained. Linguistic change underscores the extent of the metamorphosis. The 'corporate raider' has transmogrified into the 'sponsor' of 'portfolio companies'. Chrematistic financial engineering has been transformed into governance arbitrage. Private equity is no longer perceived as the domain of corporate extortionists, a characterisation graphically, if erroneously, depicted in the quintessential account of the chaotic RJR Nabisco takeover battle. Many senior banking and managerial executives have expressed a preference for undertaking consultancy for private equity funds rather than take up board positions with publicly listed corporations. 46 Despite the changed corporate landscape, the narrow normative claim advanced by the industry has remained constant. Now, as then, proponents point to four interlinked advantages associated with (even a temporary) public market exit.
First, the private equity fund recombines equity, knowledge and control. Due diligence undertaken in advance of an acquisition generates superior technical and market intelligence. 47 The key is not simply financial engineering but rather, it is claimed, a superior governance model. 48 Peter Yates, the Chief Executive of Allco Equity Partners used a seminar at the Methodist conference centre in Sydney in May 2007 to propagate the sector's work ethic. 'Financial engineering', he said, 'does not make a bad deal good; it can make a good deal great.' 49 What he omitted to mention is that the transactional risk is often transferred at an early stage. The private equity fund uses additional debt obligation to rapidly repay initial capital outlay. The banks underwriting the debt issue also reduce their exposure, through securitising and on-selling the debt. Increasingly, this debt is finding its way onto the retail market through the marketing of unsecured debentures.
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A critical refinement to public corporate governance is a simplification of the controlling mechanism. Lines of authority and responsibility are clarified and subject to ongoing review. 52 The fund may accept the operational plan put forward by entrenched management or, more regularly, provide it with syndicated in-house expertise drawn from a burgeoning range of executives recruited to either provide a consulting service or give credibility to future acquisition targets. 53 It is further argued that proximity of the owner to the decision-making process allows for any strategy reformulations to be agreed and implemented quickly.
54 Recent research suggests the most successful deals are informed by constant engagement with operational management, particularly in the first three months. 55 Particularly in cases involving the acquisition of subsidiaries this engagement reduces dramatically as a consequence of Chinese corporate IPO activity on the Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, London markets. The additional income cannot be repatriated into China because of inflationary fears. As a result, this capital is put increasingly into securitised private equity debt; see Anthony Neoh, 'China's Financial Markets -Growth corporate dependency and, if handled adroitly, energise frontline staff. This perspective is particularly propagated in the retail arena, where sales personnel are often provided with profit-sharing incentives. 56 Second, linking incentive payments to actual rather than relative performance aligns the interests of both the portfolio client manager and the fund's delegated representative. Generally, the private equity executive's own bonus is tied to the performance of his charge rather than the fund as a whole. Third, the LBO generally allows for a longer term planning process. The industry presents itself as purveyors of 'patient capital; with portfolio companies are held for at least three years before exit through re-listing in an Initial Public Offering or on-sold. 57 This gives temporary relief from earnings management imperatives associated with the public markets and allows for the deployment of investment that could, in the public markets, invoke a credit downgrade or trigger a share price reduction. 58 exiting the public market reduces the regulatory and tax burden. This may make for more effective use of capital. It also has the potential to negatively impact on corporate tax revenue, key areas of concern in the parliamentary deliberations now underway in both Canberra and Westminster. 59 In narrowly defined financial terms, therefore, the private equity model appears to offer a superior framework.
If, however, as noted above, out-performing the market is illusory outside the top quartile of funds, what other factors need to be considered to explain growing infatuation with the asset class. Regulatory flight appears superficially attractive, particularly in the United States. 60 Changes to the US corporate governance regime, including increased compliance costs and legal risk, are said to have made management much more amenable to the advantages of going private. 61 Regulators are under increasing pressure not to exercise instruments of control. Creative enforcement mechanisms, such as mandating governance change in exchange for a decision to stay or drop corporate prosecutions are presented, with partial judicial justification, as the illegitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 62 The cost (generated primarily by the audit profession itself) of validating internal control processes are blamed (on the SEC) for driving business off-market and offshore. On these accounts, the reprise of the LBO is simultaneously presented as a rational response to ill-considered political interference and evidential support for oversight retrenchment. Some critics go further and complain about the entire governance regime. Among them is Martin Lipton, one of the most influential and respected mergers and acquisitions lawyers in New York: 'The real motivation is dissatisfaction with the public market.'
63 Lipton built his practice on defending boards of management from hostile takeovers. His support for the current wave of takeovers derives primarily from the manner in which the corporate governance agenda has privileged process over strategy. Private equity is viewed as having a more effective governance system and, in the main, provides shareholders with a fair opportunity to exit:
Most of these deals are fair deals, negotiated at arms length. These are not deals in which somebody is stealing the company. Most involve some kind of auction, or market test for the price and the institutions have been very successful in the UK, Western Europe and here in forcing an increase in price when they think the initial offering is inadequate. 64 Company directors are much more receptive to private equity entreaties, he argues, because they are 'just fed up with external 'encrustations' that affect their ability to manage the company.'
65 He suggests the assault on board authority from aggressive institutional investors has profoundly changed the corporate landscape. Lipton's critique suggests that an enabling system of oversight would better protect the maintenance of the public model. The empirical evidence demonstrates that a light-touch principles-based approach to regulation does not necessarily guarantee the maintenance of public ownership. The 63 Interview with Martin Lipton (New York, 23 April 2007). 64 Ibid. Lipton made his reputation by designing the so-called 'poison pill' defence in the 1980s. Ratified by the Delaware Court of Chancery, the most important venue for adjudicating corporate disputes in the United States, the strategy imposed such onerous financial penalties that it dampened hostile takeovers for a generation. But for Lipton, two decades later market conditions make it almost impossible to sustain public ownership, especially if the price is reasonable, management agree and the process for managing market exit transparent. 65 Ibid.
City of London, for example, has also witnessed an exponential increase in private equity activity. Funds raised through initial listing were outstripped by market exits in 2006. The result has been a reduction in share availability and concomitant decline in the value of the London market.
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Tracing a direct connection with differential regulatory responses to corporate scandal, therefore, offers an incomplete and potentially misleading causal explanation. Its power is further dissipated by the fact that major private equity providers are themselves not only seeking listing but seeking a highly conditional form of it in New York itself. What soul-searching there is in Wall Street about the future of the public corporation serves a much narrower purpose. It is designed solely to pressure regulators into reducing the regulatory burden, thereby protecting its competitive advantage vis-à-vis London. While private equity in the United States is used as a mechanism to cow regulators, across the Atlantic the debate is at once more nuanced and, potentially, more destabilising, precisely because it has disturbed the foundations of market capitalism.
C
The Creative Destruction of Private Equity
One of the most parsimonious heuristic metaphors for describing the impact of private equity comes from the noted mid-20 th century economist Joseph Schumpeter. Writing in the midst of a global conflagration, Schumpeter argued that the key public policy challenge facing capitalist society was how to manage its inherent disequilibrium. For Schumpeter, the 'perennial gale' of change 'incessantly revolutionises the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.' 67 Change (potentially but not assuredly) emanates from the impact on the existing order from 'the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation.' This challenge 'strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.' Contrary to its usage by management consultants, who hijacked the term at the turn of the millennium to justify retrenchment, 'creative destruction' in the classic sense is far from unproblematic. 69 Change can weaken loyalty, trust and institutional knowledge. Contemporary ethnographies of the corporation highlight the internal social dislocation and anxiety this process generates for employees (including middle management).
70 'The divorce between command and accountability', accentuated by what Sennett terms 'a shortened framework of institutional time', can lead to 'social degradation' for those not directly remunerated by implementation. 71 Failure can have much deeper resonance if, irrespective of foundation, the entity to which the individual is attached holds iconic status as the repository of national virtues.
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Thus, unless change is deemed essential or desirable, it is difficult to neutralise wider political objections.
The private equity industry has proved increasingly adept at managing this process in the United States. The consortium bidding for control of the Texas utility company, TXU, used concern about climate change, for example, to justify a commitment to rescind plans to build 11 new coal-fired power stations. This environmental altruism served an undeclared dual purpose. First, it neutralised the environmental lobby. consummated, the company could file for bankruptcy protection.
75
Absent this cover, private equity is exceptionally vulnerable to not just the politics of envy, but also the politics of fear. Both are likely to increase before this mergers and acquisitions cycle completes precisely because many of the corporations now being targeted are neither in distress nor intrinsically mismanaged, which is why the Qantas deal, to be explored in detail below, proved so problematic.
In a highly-charged editorial, the Financial Times noted in December 2005 that 'the private equity "barbarians" are back. Only this time they are not at the gate. They are inside the castle and holding a banquet fit for a king.' 76 A year on, the paper advised the industry to 'exercise discretion'. 77 Even those most bullish about the industry's virtues accept that prudence is advisable. 'People are making a lot of money; secondly they are making a lot of money with clear action', accepts John Barber, managing partner of Citigroup Private Equity in New York. The most powerful relationship impacted by private equity, however, is endogenous to the market. While the asset class generates substantial profits for the entrepreneurs leading vehicles, recruited management and those providing capital and advisory services, it forges the creation of powerful counter-coalitions by shifting the location of core value within the regulatory sub-system. 80 In the battle for advantage, entrenched interests seek to maintain corporate or market dominance by injecting a moral and ethical 75 See above n 30-1 and accompanying text. 76 intersection between manoeuvring within relative subsystem and 'external perturbation, ie the effects of systemic events-changes in socio-economic conditions, outputs from other sub-systems and changes in the system wide governing coalitionon the resources and constraints of sub-system actors': at 148).
dimension. 'No social system can work in which everyone is supposed to be guided by nothing except his short-term utilitarian ends', warned Schumpeter when he concluded that 'the stock market is a poor substitute for the Holy Grail.' 81 The lack of transparency provides an opening for fund managers to castigate governance and regulatory arbitrage and deploy ideational resources to support legislative intervention. 82 One senior fund manager in the City of London suggests that the active support of management in private buy-outs simply increases the moral hazard.
83 He describes the market as being in a state of frenzy not seen since the 1980s:
It is hard to make the comparison because you are older, wiser, perhaps more cynical, but it does feel way worse. What was once the preserve of the landed gentry is now something that someone of thirty-two years of age can aspire to because of the 50 million to 100 million they made over the past two years. Greed will kill this. The greed of the industry will kill this.
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While somewhat overblown, the intervention serves to dilute doctrinal faith, blur self-referential boundaries and weaken the conceptual foundations of associational governance. 85 88 None appeared more so than Qantas, the Australian flag-carrier, which was subjected to the largest buy-out in aviation history. Unlocking the black box of the Qantas deal illuminates not only why the consortium lost control but also wider systemic defects.
A
The The life support system sustaining the most important putative private equity transaction in Australia was turned off at 9.10AM on Thursday 17 May. In a statement to the ASX, Airline Partners Australia ('APA'), the bidding consortium, conceded 'in the current environment and circumstances a renewed offer on terms acceptable to APA would not be likely to succeed. On that basis APA has decided not to proceed with a renewed offer at this time'. 89 The phrasing is intriguing. It identifies a problem but not its parameters. Just what does the consortium mean by highlighting the 'current environment and circumstances'? Given the global boom in private equity transactions, it appears, on the face of it, an unduly pessimistic assessment, particularly for a consortium driven by Macquarie, the pre-eminent investment bank in Australia and arguably already the largest private equity firm in the world. 90 The vaguely petulant reference to acceptable terms adds to the statement's ambiguity. It hints at a subterranean conflict, which partially emerged in the legal argument over whether the consortium had, in fact, secured that mandatory 50 per cent support on the day the offer closed.
APA based its threshold claim on a contractual clause that foreclosed the splitting of shareholdings. The clause informed potential participants they were deemed to have 'irrevocably accepted' the offer 'in respect of all your Qantas shares despite any difference between that number and the number of Qantas shares shown on the acceptance form.' 91 Whether and, if so, to what extent the untested contractual provision could be enforced, particularly when the investor in question bought additional shares, is questionable. Moreover, wresting control in such circumstances was never going to be sufficient to sway the court of public or political opinion (or indeed inure the consortium to the market).
While the belated recognition of the contractual lock-in clause may have had technical value, it smacked of sharp practice. As John Durie noted sardonically in the Australian Financial Review, the clause 'was not designed as a trap for careless hedge funds. counter to the strategy mounted throughout the takeover, opening the consortium to multiple sources of litigation risk, including from aggrieved shareholders and Australian Securities and Investment Commission ('ASIC'). Faced with ministerial questioning whether the shareholdings on which the claim was partially based may have been of doubtful legal validity, APA capitulated. 93 The rationale used then was also revealing:
Given the amount of time it would take were the issue to be litigated, and the consequent uncertainty for both Qantas and its shareholders, APA has decided not to pursue arguments that it did achieve voting power in excess of 50 per cent by the offer deadline of 4 May 2007.
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The statement deflected responsibility for failure from the financial engineers running the bid. Secondly, by not proceeding, the consortium presented itself as responsible corporate steward. Each assumption is highly questionable.
By Friday 4 May, despite a concerted campaign that threatened an immediate collapse in the Qantas share price, the consortium struggled to reach even the minimum 50 per cent required to give the bid a two week statutory extension. At 8.30PM APA conceded market rejection. 95 APA intimated that the deal had 'apparently' failed because it had secured only a 45.66 per cent acceptance rate. A number of hours later a further economic interest of 4.96 per cent was extracted from a US-based hedge fund. This late acceptance formed the basis for the APA's application to the Takeovers Panel. It argued that a technical failure to reach the threshold constituted 'unacceptable circumstances'. 97 APA, it argued, had made it clear that the bid would lapse at 7.00PM on 4 May. From the panel's perspective, the 'truth in takeovers' principle meant absent compelling evidence to the contrary, the deadline must hold. APA launched an appeal and simultaneously pressed the ASIC to intervene. Both approaches were rebuffed.
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It was only at this stage that APA pressed the 'deeming' clause, along with claims that institutional acceptance of the clause generated a further 6.09 per cent control (it was unclear whether this figures derives from the hedge fund approached on Friday evening). 99 Two explanations for the changed approach can credibly be advanced. First, APA was misguided in not availing of the mechanism to lock-in acceptances from institutional investors at a much earlier stage. Alternatively, in its desperation to get the deal across the line, the consortium momentarily revealed the endgame had the threshold been reached. In displaying but not utilising its hand, APA lost a key negotiating mechanism. It also fatally undermined the credibility of the consortium in the wider marketplace.
Much media comment has focused on the errant behaviour of one US hedge fund. 100 The broader question of why the consortium failed to lock-in sufficient acceptances in advance repays considered attention. Institutional investors appeared to have committed the smallest proportion of their shares to maximise potential profits during the mandatory two week extension should the 50 per cent threshold have been reached. This was a rational trading strategy. At its most fundamental, judgment is reducible to trust and the market did not trust the consortium's claims that the bid was on a knife-edge. Somewhat remarkably, the APA legal submission to the Takeovers Panel blamed this on the fact that 'the market was misinformed as to the prospects of the bid succeeding and … it was this misinformation that induced Qantas shareholders into a false sense that they would have more time to accept the Offer than they actually did.' 101 Market unease intensified over the weekend as APA exhausted market and regulatory approaches. Investment banking sources in Sydney suggest privately that the approach adopted by the consortium while legally efficient was counterproductive, adding, perhaps erroneously, to perceptions of hubris and arrogance in equal measure.
At a broader political level, there could be no mistaking the federal government's frustration. The final move came when the federal government ordered Qantas to identify whether the corporation had breached ownership rules by allowing untracked share trading.
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Somewhat lamely, the Qantas board replied that it was conducting an urgent reconciliation.
Ultimately, it was the failure to manage this process that made the position of the Qantas chairperson untenable. At its first board meeting after the rejection, Margaret Jackson tendered her resignation, but only after it became clear that an increasingly desperate attempt to retain the position served to undermine her credibility in the wider corporate world. 103 Although, there is merit in the suggestion by the Treasurer, Peter Costello, that the regulatory 'system has worked well', 104 retracing the tortuous flight path of the Qantas bid reveals a multitude of weak points in the governance of MBOs in Australia. 
B
The Deal Structure
Qantas is one of the most profitable airlines in the world. An effective domestic duopoly and virtual stranglehold on the lucrative trans-Pacific routes ensured high passenger yields. Although vulnerable to exogenous forces, such as an outbreak of SARS or a future terrorist attack using commercial airlines, the corporation had devised and partially implemented an ambitious growth strategy. This was based on the exponential growth of Jetstar, the group's low-cost subsidiary. Despite the opportunities, the stock languished on the Australian Stock Exchange, its legally mandated primary domicile. 105 It was not surprisingly that the board would countenance a private equity approach. Rebuffed by the Qantas board when it first offered AUS$5.35 a share, APA returned with a marginally improved offer the following day.
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Predictably enough, the bid fell within the fair price range calculated by independent advisors retained after the board endorsed the buy-out. 107 The bid was predicated on APA gaining a 90 per cent economic interest, which would allow for a compulsory purchase. It also involved the airline accruing AUS$8 billion dollars in debt. The proposed market exit of an (albeit privatised) island economy icon was always going to satisfy a national interest objection, the sole subjective criterion on which the government could block the sale. The first imperative for the consortium was to get clearance from Canberra. The consortium was carefully calibrated to allay political sensitivities. First, the retention of the existing senior management along with their strategy provided continuity. Second, private equity financing was presented as offering quantitative and qualitative benefits simply not attainable through public ownership. Potential conflicts, such as Macquarie's management role in Sydney Airport (which could limit landing slots to competitors) were presented as synergies. Equally Allco Finance's core aircraft leasing business was presented as evidence of airline experience. No mention was made that under private ownership there is no requirement for active tendering. Second, the consortium voluntarily faith (while protesting that it was unnecessary). The economic and voting interests were carefully aligned to avoid triggering formal regulatory or political scrutiny (see Figure 1) Tough talking by the Treasurer, Peter Costello, that the government would ensure that the bid satisfied all legal requirements, was, however, just that. The cleverness of the deal lay in the fact that it backed the government into an ideological corner just months before a federal election. To thwart a legally compliant offer, which provided shareholders with a 60 per cent premium, would leave the government vulnerable to criticism that it had reneged on principle. 109 While the approach represented a logical extension of principle not to intervene in the operation of the market, the government claimed the consortium had 108 Allco Equity Partners subsequently changed its own constitution, mirroring that imposed on Qantas, by limiting foreign ownership in both absolute and aggregate terms, acquiesced to additional restraints through a formal enforceable undertaking:
The Minister for Transport and Regional Services and I have negotiated and received a legally enforceable Deed from APA. The Deed has been provided voluntarily by APA and does not involve any commitments from the Commonwealth. In the event of a possible breach, the Commonwealth will be able to have the Deed enforced. The Deed will apply until APA no longer has a controlling interest in Qantas under the Corporations Act 2001 or has sold all, or substantially all, of its airline business.
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The undertaking was presented as the most detailed secured from a corporation in Australian history. In reality it was an exercise in political symbolism, totally devoid of substance.
111 Macquarie Bank was banned from voting on issues relating to Sydney Airport; it was not curtailed from engaging in the decision-making process. The requirement to retain jobs, regional services and maintenance facilities were all subject to 'market conditions'. The restrictions only applied to the consortium and there was no mechanism to extend even symbolic political control to subsequent owners. 112 In its sole contribution to the debate, the opposition Labor Party promised to subject the document to extensive legal analysis, a promise that has not been publicly followed through.
The consortium's plans attracted more searching analysis from the Takeovers Panel, which ruled 'a number of statements in, and omissions from the bidders statement 'were sufficiently misleading to give rise to unacceptable circumstances. If the APA ownership consortium had no commitment from TPG to remain in the consortium while the consortium owns or controls Qantas, reference to TPG's experience in the airline industry had the potential to mislead unless it was clearly qualified by disclosure that TPG retains the ability to sell down its entire investment in APA at any time from the completion of the APA offer.
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It was certainly appropriate for the Takeovers Panel to adjudicate the case. What is surprising is that it took a union complaint to get this matter onto the agenda. With the opposition silent and the government hamstrung, adjudication passed to the market itself. A Melbourne-based fund manager controlling four per cent of Qantas attained celebrity status by rejecting the bid (on price not principle). 115 The rejection was sufficient to scupper any chance of compulsory purchase. With APA unable to gain sufficient support, the leveraging terms were renegotiated to enable the consortium gain majority shareholding of what would remain a publicly listed corporation. The covenants were so weak that one investment banker described them as non-existent. The debt was 114 Ibid. 115 Katrina Nicholas, 'The Man Who Said No', Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 31 March 2007, 22-3 (Andrew Sissons, Managing Director of Balanced Asset Management, alleged that market pressure for the deal to proceed meant that his investment strategy, based on a three year value cycle was subjected to a 'continuous stream of deliberate misinformation': at 22. He also rejected accusations that he was merely looking for a higher price. 'Our game is relative, and theirs is absolute … We understand their rules, but we don't want to play by them': at 23). UBS Global Asset Management, which held six per cent of the airline also held out, without publicly declaring its hand (despite the fact that the parent investment banking arm of the business stood to gain AUS$40m in transaction fees); in the United States, public rejection rates are rising, particularly when management is retained, see Gretchen Morgensen, 'Just Say No to Lowball Buyout Offers', New York Times (New York), 20 May 2007 (online edition). secured in stock rather than assets. 116 In effect, the banks offered one of the largest bridging finance deals ever seen, precisely the kind of transaction that has so worried the Federal Reserve in Washington. 117 The revised strategy, disclosed to the stock exchange, indicated that AUS$4 billion would be returned to the new owners through a combination of earnings and increased debt. The disclosure made manifest the theoretical returns associated with the financial engineering, embarrassing both the government and just as significantly the banks providing the financing. Investment banking sources in Sydney suggest privately that proceeding with the deal at that stage was both a tactical and strategic mistake. The covenant-lite strategy sent an unmistakable message that risk management systems were predicated on maintaining access to underwriting assignments. More problematically, it served to fuel criticism. Media coverage turned hostile. 118 In addition, any remaining political capital was squandered. In such circumstances, it was inevitable that when the deal ran into trouble that no intervention would be forthcoming.
The financial stakes, the lauded political skills associated with Macquarie and the technical nature of the deadline breech gave the consortium an arguable case for proceeding. The hybrid nature of the Australian regulatory system, based on an admixture of rules and principles, gave flexibility to the Takeovers Panel to adopt a responsive reading of unacceptable circumstances. By rejecting the claim on literal grounds, the Takeovers Panel sent an unambiguous signal back to the business community. 119 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission reinforced this. Whether by accident or design, the planned legal challenge represented a challenge to the legitimacy of the regulatory process. Furthermore, it placed the consortium on a collision path with the federal government. The timing here is instructive. The Treasury's call for Qantas to reconcile its share register was made only when all other avenues had been exhausted. In so doing, it made a difficult case to argue unsustainable. Amid rumours that it was targeting British Airways, APA withdrew and pulled down its website. Macquarie released operating profits of AUS$1.5 billion that the chief executive argued provided 'a very convincing measure of our reputation'.
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The Qantas fiasco was blamed on tactical misjudgment by a 'number of key investors', partial recognition that the sole focus on Samuel Heyman's hedge fund operation is misplaced. Moss sought, however, to apportion blame to the activities of hedge funds more generally, which had been encouraged to enter the share registry precisely because they were likely to sell. The failure to handle the process could cost Macquarie dear in terms of relations with key players in the hedge fund community in the future. 121 A second embarrassment, involving the failure to gain control of Alinta was also blithely cast aside. 122 As the Bank changed 'from being an Australian institution growing internationally to a global institution headquartered in Australia … our business is way bigger than two transactions in one country.' 123 With significant opportunities occurring offshore, there is a reduced imperative to foster domestic relations or exercise restraint. The insouciance suggests that Macquarie growth model centres solely on financial returns. It is undoubtedly successful. The dominance over the Australian market makes exercising control much more problematic. In such circumstances, the only credible restraint can come from a wider industry commitment to a redesigned regulatory framework. disclosure obligations imposed after the collapse of Enron and other corporations in both the United States and here in Australia. The transformative potential (and risk) occurs at a number of levels. As noted above these include, but are not limited to: the impact of entreaties on the governance of target corporations; the efficacy of fiduciary duty, conflicts of interest management systems and codes of conduct as restraining forces on financial intermediary self-dealing; and the danger of market manipulation and wider macroeconomic instability. 124 These challenges pertain irrespective of whether the regulatory regime adopted is primarily mandatory (US), enabling (UK), or combined (Australia). As the debate over private equity intensifies, so to does the contestation over the efficacy of control mechanisms at each node in the overarching matrix. 125 The discussion below centres primarily on the Australian legal and regulatory framework in the aftermath of the Qantas debacle.
A
The Limits of Directorial Discretion
For the senior management of the corporation and its professional advisors the pre-contract stage is the most problematic. How each node manages the potential conflict with existing shareholders or their delegated authority, the board of directors, over what constitutes the long-term interests of the corporation determines the integrity of the wider corporate governance architecture. Insofar as the strategic decisions are taken in good faith and with reasonable diligence, the business judgment default applies. 126 Directors have a statutory obligation to disclose any potential conflict of interest.
127 They also have a common law obligation to 'identify clearly the perceived conflict and to suggest a course of action to limit the possible damage. in LBOs involving entrenched management makes this process exceptionally difficult to manage.
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The pre-eminent obligation on the board is to ascertain whether the sale of the corporation is in its best interest. This is determined by reference to both procedural fairness and price. Guidance recently provided by the Takeovers Panel is designed to articulate what both mean in practice. Participating insiders should disclose the proposed buyout approach to the board prior to the provision of non-public information. 130 In addition, this information should only be disclosed with board consent. 131 On immediate notification of a potential bid, the board is advised to establish protocols to distance the corporation from the conflicted managers.
While noting the absence of a legal requirement to launch a full auction, the Takeovers Panel argues that financial information should be made freely available to trigger (at the very least) a rival bid. Failure by a target company board to do so would, it is suggested, be viewed with suspicion. 132 
B
Investing in Conflict
The transformation of investment banks from passive provider of capital or advisory services to active fund managers represents a significant recalibration of the integrated banking model. 134 The surge in Macquarie Bank's profits was inextricably linked to its global private equity operation. Goldman Sachs recently announced plans to launch a US$19 billion superfund. Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity Partners already controls one of the top ten private equity funds. Both saw overall profits increase dramatically last year.
135 Merrill Lynch's unit reported a 300 per cent increase in profits for the second quarter in 2006, in part because of the profits accruing from the Hertz 'flip back'. 136 The contribution these units make to group profits demonstrates their critical importance. One Capital Partners, the private equity arm of J P Morgan, contributed US$550 million of the US$3.5 billion profit announced in 2006.
The situation is exacerbated by debate over at what precise stage investment banks owe fiduciary duties to their clients and whether these restrictions can or should be contracted out by sidebar arrangements. 
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Macquarie Bank, for example, found itself in an overt conflict in the machinations surrounding a MBO at Alinta. The utility company, to examine a range of strategic options, retained Macquarie, which then surfaced as a key advisor to the management-led buy-out team. When the potential conflict was initially reported, both Macquarie and Alinta proclaimed that their actions were within legal boundaries. The Bank sought to clarify its position but not before it had been very publicly sacked and the chief executive officer resigned.
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A critical part of the regulatory infrastructure to curtail insider trading and market manipulation among financial intermediaries has been to foster the creation and maintenance of 'Chinese Walls'. These impose a structural separation between corporate 'insiders' (for example, those advising external corporations on mergers and acquisitions or running private equity funds) and 'outsiders' (for example, those trading on behalf of clients or the bank's own account on the basis of publicly available information).
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Within the private equity context, the rise in proprietary trading raises significant questions about the quality of the oversight process, in circumstances known to the parties and the purpose and object of the transaction: at [281]). 138 Whether compliance is an adequate framework is highly questionable. particular whether informational barriers prevent the trading of nonpublic information. While regulators in Australia have been careful not to become embroiled in deal specific private equity controversies, there can be no mistaking unease. This concern was particularly apparent in draft guidelines offered by the Takeovers Panel over the integrity questions posed by the integrated investment banking model:
The Panel does not intend to impede normal business transaction or relationships, which are not relevant in the context of a control transaction. However, the Panel will be concerned if professional and other advisors who, by reason of their previous association with a target company have come into possession on non-public information seek to become part of an actual or potential bidding vehicle or bidding consortium.
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The actions of both the senior management and Macquarie in the Alinta case, for example, would appear to trigger regulatory concern identified above.
IV THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY REFORM
Mapping how ideational discourse is calibrated requires detailed analysis across a number of key stages, including control over the agenda, implementation and evaluation. 142 How are different constituencies organising and mobilising themselves. How is change in one jurisdiction experienced elsewhere? How are pressures to reform regulatory practice transmitted from one jurisdiction to another, and by which methods? What is the mediating impact of intervening variables, such as national structures, institutions, political preferences and societal interests? Within the scope of this paper it is only possible to sketch the outlines of this process, in large part because we are at such an early stage in the private equity cycle.
The preference for self-regulation is particularly evident in the private equity firmament. What has also become clear is that the industry has become increasingly cognisant of the need to enlist support or at least nullify external criticism. 143 The creation of a Private Equity Council in Washington on 26 December 2006 by the premier funds -including Blackstone, KKR and Carlyle -is an indication of just how important it has become to pro-actively manage the policy process, even in the United States. 144 Signaling over tax issues, in particular whether 'carried interest' represented capital gains has spooked the industry. Private equity spokespersons gave a particularly desultory performance at the Westminster Treasury Select Committee recently. Their performance was not helped by the quip by a senior practitioner that cleaners pay more tax. 145 Likewise, in the United States, former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, now Vice Chairman at Citigroup, has maintained that the case exists to look at the private equity tax base. Private equity funds have also sought to influence the wider debate through a series of funded research initiatives and the establishment of extensive lobbying networks.
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A comparison of the debate in London and New York highlights differential political priorities and ideational referents. In the United States, the debate is still carried out at a rather technical level in which wider socio-political considerations are deemed irrelevant. The takeover 143 145 'Taken to the Cleaners', The Economist (London), 12 June 2007 (online edition). As The Economist notes, however, the danger is that changing tax structures will simply encourage private equity firms to relocate to more favorable regimes, 146 Private equity funds announced a two million dollar research project at the World Economic Forum in Davos. It will be coordinated by the Dean of Columbia Business School, Glenn Hubbard. Here in Australia, the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association has retained professional consultants to provide research demonstrating added value. Its submission to the Senate Inquiry prominently displays a favourable quote from the FSA on the utility of private equity on its cover sheet. Nowhere in the submission does it respond to the FSA's concerns about market manipulation and insider-trading, see AVCAL, above n 13 and accompanying text.
of failing car company Chrysler illustrates differences in attitude between New York and London. As noted above, it is indicative of private equity's growth that it secured control with relatively little opposition. Moreover, the restructuring, redesign and re-engineering however brutal, is seen as a necessary corrective to the problems of public market bureaucracy. 'There is a reason why Toyota is the number one car company in the United States at least in terms of profitability', says John Barber of Citigroup Private Equity in New York.
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It is because for 35 years the unions thought short-term about how many people they thought should be employed, what they should make, and the work rules, and for that reason they have driven Detroit into ruin. When private equity firms come in they are making companies which are going to be much more competitive long term in the global economy than the companies they takeover. 148 This rationale has been widely accepted within political discourse in the United States. Notwithstanding the House Financial Services Committee Hearings, with the potential exception of tax, change is much more likely to emanate from the global export of initiatives now under way in the United Kingdom, which offers a mediation between European rejection and American embrace.
Oppositional rhetoric in the United Kingdom has not quite descended to that heard in Germany, where private equity funds have been castigated as 'locusts', but it has come close. The leading private equity fund Permira has been subject to a virulent campaign of abuse. This included parading a camel outside a church service attended by its chief executive, Damon Buffini. 149 Substantial job losses at high-profile acquisitions in the United Kingdom such as at the Automobile Association, National Car Parks and Birds Eye, have galvanised union opposition, according to the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress ('TUC'), the peak movement for organised labor. 147 Interview with John Barber, above n 11. 148 Ibid. 149 The insult relates to a Bible parable that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than get into heaven, see 'Damon Buffini', Profile, Money Week (London), 23 February 2007, 40. In all of those cases there have been issues of union recognition or job cuts in ways that are seen as simply not acceptable. The ultimate owners are not seen as people who can be engaged or properly held accountable for the decisions that they are ultimately responsible for. 150 As with Australia, union membership and influence went into precipitous decline in the United Kingdom. Paradoxically, private equity has reversed that process. The TUC has now emerged as potentially the most effective alternative voice within the European Union. It has done so not by strike action but by embarrassing both the government and the private equity movement through adopting the language of governance and transparency.
The bombastic way in which private equity has presented leverage as tax efficient has undermined somewhat the credibility of its claims of responsible corporate citizenship. By raising the issue now, the unions raise an inevitable corollary: why hasn't New Labour stepped in? The departure of Tony Blair has forced contenders for the New Labour leadership to attend much more closely to underpinning ideological principles. The political changing of the guard thus provided a timelimited opportunity for the unions to influence the direction of policy. In a recent speech, Barber likened the private equity funds to 'amoral asset strippers after a quick buck.'
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Despite the rhetoric, Barber has also recognised that engagement rather than confrontation is more likely to generate results. The key leverage device has been the 300 billion under asset management with trades union pension funds. ' We have in the TUC a network of a 1000 trustees and we are working on a briefing note for that network. It will not be saying just pull out of private equity. That would be naïve.' 152 Instead the unions are working on a draft set of protocols governing how the pension funds intermediate with private equity.
Paradoxically, the global private equity boom has been driven by the injection of capital from the very source that the reinvigorated corporate governance paradigm posits as exercising the necessary control over managerial excess. Across the capital markets public pension funds 150 Interview with Brendan Barber (London, 23 March 2007). 151 Christopher Adams and Peter Smith, 'TUC Chief Attacks Private Equity Industry', Financial Times (London), 20 February 2007, 1. Barber further claimed the industry was 'pretty much allowed to operate with impunity': ibid. 152 Ibid.
have made a strategic decision to invest heavily in private equity but done little to agitate for stronger contractual covenants. 153 Just as problematically, notwithstanding claims of ethical investment, there is reduced emphasis on potential costs to current members. 154 According to the TUC General Secretary, the aim in starting a dialogue with the trustees is strategic: 'It will be asking them to encourage them to consider the kinds of businesses and the approach to business that private equity takes.' 155 The first step is the development of key protocols that are capable of monitoring and enforcement..
The challenge is for us to identify in more precise terms than we have done to date what are the principles that we expect the private sector to live up to. We have to think through how that can be articulated. We have to think through both the principles and some mechanism of securing compliance, otherwise the principles themselves can be pretty vacuous.
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Having re-found its voice, the trades union movement is unlikely to accept entreaties by either the industry or Treasury to leave the governance of private equity to a technocratic elite. In so doing it may be providing a scarce public good. In this regard, the defensive and narrow approach adopted by the Australian superannuation industry to the Senate Inquiry is not only shortsighted. It is also arguably an abdication of responsibility. The creative destruction of private equity forces may reduce the degree of public oversight. It also enhances the degree to which private equity owners -including the pension funds -must take responsibility for stakeholders whose voice has been silenced. 153 Alan Murray, 'How Labor's Pension Funds Are Playing Private Equity Two Ways', Wall Street Journal (New York), 28 February 2007, A10 (quoting research that 22 per cent of all new money raised for private equity funding in the United States in 2005 derived from labor superannuation schemes). Sometimes the dialectic between disclosure and privacy can pertain within the one investor. Contrast, for example, the shareholder activism displayed by California Public Employees Pension Fund within the corporate governance arena generally with its resistance to the release of information relating to its own private equity investments: see Hurdle, above n 40, 255-7. 154 A case in point is the Qantas superannuation fund, which declined to mandate the voting interests of the three investment managers with delegated authority over its stake in the airline: see 'Qantas Staff Fund Won't OK Takeover', The Australian (Sydney), 8 February 2007, 23. 155 Interview with Brendan Barber, above n 154. 156 Ibid.
CONCLUSION
As this paper has demonstrated, the expansion of private equity poses a series of interconnected risks to both the corporate governance paradigm and to the regulation of the markets. Whether individual corporations undertake novel financing arrangements or acquiesce to excessive debt levels are, of course risk appetite decisions best left to the business itself. In that regard, for example, the federal government's decision to allow the Qantas sale to proceed, given that it did not breach legal restraints, was both rational and, in the circumstances, justified. What the takeover boom has also demonstrated, however, is the paucity of guidance to ensure that appropriate checks and balances are in place to limit managerial incentives to de-list.
The policy advice provided by the Takeovers Panel here in Australia is a credible attempt to close down some of the loopholes. It also highlights the critical importance of linking abstract principles to granular articulations of what these principles mean in practice. This goes some way to ensuring that potential directorial abuses are minimised and that shareholder interests will be protected. This does not solve, however, the wider question of the impact of private equity on the wider corporate governance paradigm. Restoring faith in market forces requires participants to pay much greater attention to the interwoven relationship between the market, legal restraints and the political process. Public listing provides a mechanism to reinforce the softer conceptions of governance associated with stakeholder rights, if only because there are opportunities to hold the company to account. An expansion of private equity may also lead to an erosion of conceptions of corporate social responsibility not least because success is measured on strictly financial terms.
A more difficult regulatory challenge is how to link acceptance of market risk with the development of more sophisticated mechanisms to ensure it is carried out within acceptable levels of probity. The transaction fees involved certainly raise at least the prospect that internal restraining mechanisms may not be powerful enough to ensure effective due diligence. This problem pertains throughout the investment cycle, from provision of strategic advice to rebuff or acquiesce in a leverage buy-out, through to the IPO allocation when private equity seeks to dispose of the asset.
The increasing involvement of investment banking in the management of private equity funds reinforces the potential problems. The difficulties are magnified precisely because regulators have been placed increasingly on the defensive over the limits of regulatory authority. Just as private equity providers have only themselves to blame for poor media management of their personal lives, strategic miscalculations on the part of the regulator can lead to seepage of media and political support.
Private equity does offer many benefits, not least the possibility of energising tired corporate models. It also poses substantial risks. How it should be regulated is a matter of profound public concern. What is required is sustained engagement between regulators, the professions and market participants. This debate is a vital component of the due diligence necessary to moderate the forces of creative destruction unleashed across global financial markets.
